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Abstract
This project explores the relationship between political ideology, feminist selfidentification and support for feminist policy. The purpose of this research is to help explain why
millennials reject the feminist label despite holding positive attitudes towards feminist policy. A
survey of 312 Syracuse University students is used to study this relationship. Consistent with my
hypothesis, I find that compared to conservatives, liberals are more likely to identify as feminist
and support feminist policy. However, I also find that among liberals and conservatives, support
for feminist policies is greater than self-identification as a feminist and the gap between selfidentification as a feminist and support for feminist policy is greater among conservatives. I
conclude that while there are significant differences in policy preferences between liberals and
conservatives on abortion, scholars and feminists should recognize common ground on the issue
of equal pay to help bring more conservatives into the feminist movement.
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Executive Summary
My Renée Crown Honors Capstone project in conjunction with my Political Distinction
Thesis, “Political Ideology and Feelings Towards Feminism: Why Young People Reject the
Feminist Label” explores the relationship between young people’s political ideology and partisan
identification with support for feminist policy and feminist self-identification. The purpose of my
research is to provide further explanation for young people’s reluctance to identify as feminist.
Current literature points to social explanations such as the “man-hating” perception of feminism;
however, I suggest that these understandings neglect the impact of political ideology on young
people’s hesitancy to identify as feminists.
I use a historical overview of feminism’s association with liberal policy and the
Democratic Party to examine how one’s political identity is correlated to one’s acceptance or
rejection of the feminist label. Current research finds that self-identified liberals and Democrats
are more likely to identify as feminist than self-identified conservatives and Republicans
(McCabe 2005). However, I suspect that despite rejecting the feminist label, conservatives and
Republicans will be sympathetic to feminist policies such as abortion, equal pay and paid family
leave. Using this information, I develop two hypotheses.
The first is the liberal support hypothesis. In this hypothesis, I suggest that consistent
with existing research, liberal millennials will be more likely than conservative millennials both
to support feminist policies and to self-identify as a feminist. My second hypothesis is the policylabel gap hypothesis. Consistent with existing research, I expect that support for feminist policies
will be greater than self-identification as a feminist. However, I expect that this gap between
policy support and the feminist label will be greatest among conservative millennials. More

3

specifically, I anticipate that conservative millennials will more strongly reject the feminist label
despite holding views that are quite positive toward gender equality.
I test this hypothesis using survey data collected from 312 Syracuse University
undergraduate students. Through this method, I gauge respondent’s policy preferences and
identification as feminists by asking a variety of self-identification questions and questions
regarding general and feminist policies. A randomization component is included in which half the
respondents are given policy questions before women’s issues questions and vice versa in order to
ensure that there is a balance between the possibility of politics priming people’s views on
feminism and feminism priming people’s views on politics. This data is then analyzed using cross
tabulations to determine whether the relationships between political ideology and feminism are
statistically significant.
Consistent with the expectations of my liberal support hypothesis, I find that there is a
statistically significant relationship between political ideology and likeliness to identify as a
feminist. The more liberal you are, the more likely you are to agree with the statement: I am a
feminist. In addition, the more liberal you are, the more likely you are to agree that when you think
of the term feminist, you think of someone like yourself.
I also find that conservatives regard issues of gender equality as less important than liberals.
It is extremely important to self-identified liberals that women hold elected office while
conservatives are far less likely to be concerned about women’s rights and list gender equality as
one of their top issues they consider when they vote. Inconsistent with my policy-label gap
hypothesis, there is also a significant difference in positions on abortion. Conservatives and
Republicans are far more likely to oppose abortion than liberals and Democrats. However,
consistent with the policy-label gap hypothesis, there is some common ground on the issue of equal
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pay and paid family leave. The majority of conservative, very liberal and somewhat liberal
respondents agree that private employers should be required to pay men and women the same
salary for equal work. The majority of both Democrats and Republicans said that women should
always be paid the same as men for the same job. Additionally, a piece of legislation that provides
eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of paid leave had mild support from conservatives and
strong support among liberals. A takeaway from studying support for equal pay, paid family leave
and abortion is that consistent with my hypothesis, among both liberals and conservatives, support
for feminist policies is greater than self-identification as a feminist. The gap between selfidentification as a feminist and support for equal pay and paid family leave is greater among
conservatives than liberals.
I use this data to suggest that conservatives have more support for feminist policy than
their rejection of the feminist label lets on. I also argue that rather than only focusing on
significant policy differences on abortion, scholars and feminists should recognize common
ground on the issue of equal pay to help bring more conservatives into the feminist movement.
This is worth exploring because after examining how the feminist label impacts the actions of
elected officials, it seems probable that identifying as a feminist has positive consequences for
the general public. While more research is needed to further examine the relationship between
political ideology and partisan identification with support for feminist policies and selfidentification as a feminist, this paper brings new understanding to the complicated question of
why young people are reluctant to identify as feminist.
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Preface
My junior year at Syracuse University, I took a Gender and Politics class with Professor
Danielle Thomsen. There, I found myself frequently reminded about my seemingly contradictory
labels: conservative and woman. It was during one class in particular that my identity was
questioned. The conversation was about sexism in the Republican Party. During this class
discussion, I was told by a fellow classmate that if I identify as conservative, I am sexist.
This was frustrating to me. I always felt that myself, along with other young
conservatives, want gender equality no less than any self-described liberal. I starting thinking
about the relationship between political ideology and feminism as whole. I thought about the
other millions of women that identified as conservative. Were they all sexist, too? Could none of
them be considered feminist just because feminism is usually aligned with the Democratic Party?
I began to think, just because conservatives don’t typically identify as feminist doesn’t mean that
they don’t have similar attitudes and goals of liberal feminists.
These questions and frustrations fueled over a year of independent research that aims to
unpack the feminist label. Through my research, I find some answers to my questions. I find
similarities and differences between conservatives and liberals on feminist policy issues that I
both expect and didn’t expect. I also find hope. I find hope that one day, liberals and
conservatives in classrooms and political events throughout the country will see beyond their
labels in order to work together and discover common ground. I find hope that the feminist
movement will one day be a more inclusive movement than it is today.
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Introduction
The historic 2017 Women’s March on Washington showcased a unique display of feminist
activism. The New York Times estimated that 470,000 people attended the march that centered on
opposing President Donald Trump and advocating for policies regarding women’s rights and other
human rights issues. Although the march saw great unity, there was a notable divide. New
Wave Feminists, a group that was originally listed as a partner for the event, was disinvited after
backlash spread about the group's pro-life stance (“Pro-Life Feminist” 2017). The idea that today’s
feminists reject those who morally oppose abortion is unsurprising given that the majority of prolife men and women do not identify as feminist (Schreiber 2008). However, this raises questions
about how to define the feminist movement and those who identify with it. Who are the men and
women that identify as feminist and what does it mean, in terms of policy preferences, to be a
feminist today?
While much literature focuses on the topic of feminist self-identification, there is little
attention to understanding its relationship with political ideology. Although both liberals and
conservatives are reluctant to identify as feminist (Anderson 2009), there is a largely accepted
view among scholars that people with liberal political views are more likely to identify as feminist
because liberal social and economic policies are more compatible with feminist ideas. However,
as young conservatives become increasingly moderate (Jacobson 2016) it seems probable that their
political views may be more compatible with those of the feminist movement.
Using survey data collected from 312 Syracuse University students, I find that, consistent
with existing research, conservatives regard issues of gender equality as less important than
liberals. Despite this difference and differences in opinion on abortion, I find that there is some
common ground among young liberals and young conservatives on women’s issues like equal pay
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and paid family leave. For both conservatives and liberals, support for feminist policy is greater
than their self-identification as a feminist. I also find that this gap between identification and
support is greatest among conservatives.
I use this data to suggest that rather than only focusing on policy differences between
conservatives and liberals (such as with abortion in the case of the Women’s Rights March),
scholars and feminists should recognize that common ground on equal pay can help bring more
conservatives into the feminist movement. In order to fully examine this relationship, I will first
provide background information and review existing research on this topic. Then, I will outline
the research design and provide the results of my survey. Finally, I will draw conclusions from the
data and discuss its further implications. As I will explore in the conclusion, studying the
relationship between political ideology and feminist self-identification is important because if
more women identified as feminists, it is probable that more policy improving women’s rights
would be passed.

Background Information
In order to evaluate the current relationship between political identity and feminism, it is
important to understand how party positions on women’s rights have changed over time. Before
the late 1960s, the agenda for women’s rights was mostly limited to concerns such as the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), discrimination in employment and benefits and equal pay (Wolbrecht
1997). Early on, issues like the ERA drew support from both sides. Today, the ERA is not
supported by the Republican Party (Wolbrecht 1997) and the women’s rights agenda includes
many other issues such as sexual harassment, maternity and family leave, child care, women’s
health and abortion. According to existing literature (Wolbrecht 1997), these changes were more
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compatible with the Democratic Party’s platform. For Democrats, “The changing women’s rights
agenda fit well with the party’s position in favor of an activist government and sympathetic
posture,” especially given their history of being linked to social movements of the 1960s
(Wolbrecht 1997).
Furthermore, the initiation and activism of Democratic women played a large role in
shaping conceptions of women’s rights and ultimately making the Democratic Party the party of
feminism. Wolbrecht (1997) examines the co-sponsorship of pro-women’s rights bills by female
legislators of both major parties to measure this. Although women from both parties are more
likely to be the first co-sponsor of pro-women’s rights legislation than men, Democratic women
are consistently significantly more likely to be the first cosponsor than Republican women
(Wolbrecht 1997). Feminist Democrats were also more active in advocating for women’s rights.
One example is Martha Griffith’s efforts to secure the discharge petition signatures necessary to
bring the ERA to a vote in the House of Representatives. A more modern day example is Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand’s Military Justice Improvement Act, aimed at reforming procedures to help
combat sexual assault that takes place in the military (“Military Justice Improvement Act” 2017).
In contrast with this acceptance by the Democratic Party, these new issue areas included in
women’s rights conflicted with traditional social conservatism in the Republican Party. To
Republicans, policies such as sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination and equal pay required
government action that interfered with business action. Wolbrecht (1997) argues that Republicans
were uncomfortable with the new women’s rights agenda. More currently, there is further evidence
that today’s Republican Party rejects feminist policies. This is illustrated by what the author of
Righting Feminism, Ronnee Schreiber, calls anti-feminist women’s rights organizations, such as
the Independent Women’s Forum (IWF) and Concerned Women for America (CWA). The IWF is
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a fiscally conservative organization founded by activist Rosalie Silberman to promote a
“conservative alternative to feminist tenets”. Concerned Women for America is a Christian
socially conservative group that opposes feminist policies such as abortion (Schreiber 2012).
Overall, these changes in party positions on women’s rights have made feminism more
closely aligned with the Democratic Party. This helps explain why more Democrats identify as
feminist than Republicans (McCabe 2005). Yet, in the middle of this hostile divide on feminism
between liberals and conservatives, demographic shifts are underway that impact attitudes on
feminism. According to Pew Research’s survey of more than 10,000 Americans, millennials are
considerably more liberal than other generations. Even conservative millennials are more moderate
than older conservatives (Jacobson 2016). According to Jacobson (2016) fewer young Republicans
are willing to identify themselves as conservative. Seventy percent of Republicans who are older
than 65 consistently identify as conservative. Fewer than half — about 20 percent — of the oldest
Republicans call themselves moderates. In contrast, among Republicans under the age of 30, the
amount of self-identified moderates and self-identified conservatives are about equal. Young
Republicans are also more likely to support the Affordable Care Act and be to the left of their
elders on issues of immigration, environmentalism, and same-sex marriage (Jacobson 2016).
This is reason to believe that young conservative’s likeliness to identify as a feminist would
increase. Yet, it does not. Even though millennials are more liberal across the board, young people
are consistently reluctant to identify as feminists (Anderson 2009). Anderson (2009) conducted a
study that found that a large portion of university women (45.4%) agreed with some of the
objectives of the feminist movement but chose not to identify as a feminist, while 32.6% of men
agreed with some feminist objectives, yet did not identify as a feminist. A minority of both female
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and male participants, 6.6% of women and 0.8% of men, stated that they would identify themselves
as a feminist either privately or publicly.
Since millennials are increasingly liberal yet still reluctant to identify as feminist, this
suggests that policy attitudes do not completely explain it. This thesis explores what explains this
disconnect.

Literature Review
There have been various explanations for young people’s reluctance to embrace the
feminist label, yet, it appears two main perspectives have emerged. One viewpoint is that young
women find feminism obsolete and do not want to fight for equality. The other explanation is that
there are undesirable stereotypes and ideas associated with feminism that prevent young people
from identifying as feminist. I will then suggest that political ideology is also playing a critical
role in the lack of feminist self-identification.
The “Post-Feminism Era”
The first body of literature suggests that after women earned the right to vote and
significant control over their reproductive rights with the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,
many young people do not find that there are serious barriers to gender equality (Scharff 2012;
Dicker 2008). In one study by Scharff (2012), qualitative in-depth interviews with young women
concluded that views on feminism often correspond to the perception of what obstacles women
face and the severity of them. Since millennials live in a “post-feminism” era, it is argued that they
do not understand what it has taken to strengthen gender equality and therefore, do not prioritize
further steps to achieve it. Aronson (2003) agrees, finding that since the early 1980s, “Women in
their teens and twenties [have been labelled] the “postfeminist generation”, … who are thought to
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benefit from the women’s movement through expanded access to employment and education …
[but] do not push for further political change”.
This notion of a “Post-Feminist generation” is fundamental to Lisa Hogeland’s argument
(1994). She suggests that young women are afraid to have the type of awareness and gender
consciousness that it takes to be a feminist. Hogeland argues that young people are not willing to
emotionally commit to being feminists partially because standing “opposed to your
culture…critical of institutions, behaviors [and] discourses” does not appear to be in their
immediate interest (Hogeland 1).
The Anti-Feminine and “Man Hating” Perception of Feminism
Another finding by Scharff (2012) is that young women associate feminism with
extremism and non-traditional womanhood. As Scharff notes, “Young women who discuss
feminism often feel they have to navigate, or pre-empt, being regarded a man-hater or a lesbian”
(Scharff 2012). Anderson (2009) also found that this negative stigma around the feminist label
influences both men and women to not identify as a feminist, despite often agreeing with many
feminist objectives. There was significant variation in how feminist men and women were viewed.
Feminist men were associated with “more stereotypically feminine characteristics (i.e.,
cooperative, affectionate, patient … and weak, emotional, and submissive)”. In contrast, feminist
women were rated by male and female respondents as lower in these categories and were deemed
less feminine. Feminist women were also rated by male and female respondents as lower on the
attractiveness measure (Anderson 2009).
Additionally, a 2015 Washington Post/Kaiser poll captures the belief that feminism is
associated with “man-hating”. The poll showed that 46% of men and women said that the feminist
movement unfairly blames men for women’s problems. This position was particularly strong
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among conservative women (57%) and men as whole (52%). Despite this popular belief, a study
of 488 college students regarding ambivalent sexism towards men showed that feminists reported
lower levels of hostility toward men than did non-feminists (Anderson 2009).
Political Ideology
These more social explanations seem to neglect the impact of political ideology on young
women’s hesitancy to identify as feminists. In terms of political opinion, we already know that
conservative women are more reluctant than liberal women to identify as feminists (McCabe
2005). Using data from the 1996 General Society Survey, McCabe looked at self-identified liberals
and conservatives as well as self-identified Democrats and Republicans. Her results showed that
feminists are more likely to be highly educated, urban women who self-identify as liberals and
Democrats. However, the relationship between political ideology and young people’s attitudes
towards feminism is yet to be fully explored. It is not clear whether young people who do not
identify as feminist, truly have policy attitudes towards women’s issues that are not, in fact,
feminist. McCabe looked at self-identified liberals, conservatives, Democrats and Republicans
rather than viewing their policy preferences. This is important to note because someone can still
identify as a Republican or a conservative and have policy preferences on women’s issues that are
considered feminist. Fully studying the relationship between political ideology and feminism
opens up a new door in understanding why young people, and specifically young conservatives,
are reluctant to identify as feminists.
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Hypothesis
This history of support for feminist policies and the feminist label among liberals and
Democrats (Wolbrecht 1997) paired with data on feminist self-identification (McCabe 2005) led
me to my first hypothesis.
1. Liberal support hypothesis: Consistent with existing research (McCabe 2005), I
expect that liberal millennials will be more likely than conservative millennials both to
support feminist policies such as equal pay, paid family leave and abortion and to selfidentify as a feminist.
H1: More liberal ideology à more support for feminist policy
More liberal ideology à more feminist self-identification
The social stigmas about feminism such as the “man-hating” perception, along with other
data showing reluctance to identify as feminist (Anderson 2009), led me to my second hypothesis
(H2A). Additionally, data that suggests conservative millennials are becoming more liberal on
social issues (Jacobson 2016) as well as the lack of research on political ideology and its
relationship with feminism led me to my second hypothesis (H2B).
2. Policy-Label gap hypothesis:
A. Consistent with existing research (Anderson 2009), I expect that for both liberal
and conservative millennials, support for feminist policies will be greater than selfidentification as a feminist.
H2A: For all ideology groups feminist policy support > feminist self-identification
B. I expect that this gap between policy support and the feminist label will be the
greatest among conservative millennials. I anticipate that conservative millennials
will more strongly reject the feminist label despite holding views that are quite
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positive toward gender equality. For example, I think that young conservatives will
have general support for feminist policies such as equal pay, paid family leave and
abortion despite not identifying as feminist. If the data support my expectations, it
would suggest that conservative millennials are sympathetic to feminist policy
positions yet strongly reject the label. This would highlight that there is a negative
stigma about feminism prohibiting young conservatives from identifying as
feminists.
H2B: Difference between policy support and feminist self-identification > for
conservatives than for liberals

Research Design
In order to test these hypotheses, I created, distributed and analyzed an online survey
using Qualtrics. The survey was distributed by professors in the Political Science Department at
Syracuse University to their students in order to ensure a younger sample.1 The sample size is
312 people. A full list of survey questions can be found in the Appendix.
A survey is used as the research method because it is particularly helpful when trying to
measure how people identify with feminism. Self-identification as a feminist is an important part
of both of my hypotheses, particularly H1. Specific to feminism, there is social pressure. For
example, some respondents may feel it is socially desirable to answer that they are feminists, or,
some may be hesitant to identify as feminists due to negative social stigmas about feminism. The
anonymity provided by a survey decreases this social pressure and allows people to answer these

1

This project was approved by Syracuse University’s Institutional Research Board IRB #: 17100
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questions more honestly than they would if this was a face-to-face interview.
Similarly, the survey helps capture attitudes on women’s issues in a clear and measurable
way. This survey included questions specific to feminism and issues commonly categorized as
women’s issues such as equal pay, paid family leave and abortion. I selected these issues because
they are at the forefront of current gender equality debates and feminist legislative action. An
example of a question asked was: Should private employers be required to pay men and women
the same salary for the same job? Each question is measured based on the specific question, but
in many cases there are options such as, “Always, almost always, sometimes, almost never, and
never”. In this example, the people who select “Always and almost always” have stronger
support for the policy and the people who select “almost never and never” have weaker support
for the policy. These questions in the form of a survey help test H2A by providing a clear
measurement of respondent’s support for feminist policies to compare to their identification as a
feminist.
Through the survey, I am also able to gauge respondent’s policy preferences and part
identity. I designed the survey to identify where each person falls on the political ideological
scale by asking a variety of general policy questions. Some of the questions include: Where do
you place yourself on an ideological scale from very liberal to very conservative? Do you
identify as Democrat, Independent, Republican or other? A survey helped capture a spectrum on
political attitudes and identities, rather than interviews with Republican affiliated and
Democratic affiliated organizations that would have left out moderate individuals.
A survey is also used because it allows for a particular structure that is beneficial to
gathering data that wasn’t skewed. Specifically, the survey included a randomization component
in which half the respondents were given policy questions before women’s issues questions and
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vice versa. I designed the survey this way to ensure that there was a balance between the
possibility of politics priming people’s views on feminism and feminism priming people’s views
on politics.
Finally, a survey is used to help determine whether differences between political groups
are statistically significant. Rather than comparing verbal statements of liberals and
conservatives with a broad way of measurement, this survey allows for the statistical
measurement of the data. This occurs at the p.00 and the p.05 level.
There are several limitations of the study. It is evident that my respondents are not
entirely representative of the U.S. millennial population in terms of geography, socio-economic
status, sex and ethnicity. All of my respondents were from Syracuse University. Their education
level presumes that many of them are from similar socio-economic status. In terms of sex, about
65% of my respondents are female. Additionally, 79% of my respondents are white. According
to the Brookings Institute, this is very different from the general population. Overall, millennials
are only 55.8% white (Frey 2016). A more racially diverse group of respondents would have
been a better representation of the population.
In terms of ideology, my respondents are fairly representative of the young population
when compared with recent data. The majority of respondents in this survey consider themselves
very liberal (29%) or somewhat liberal (29%) compared to moderate (21%) somewhat
conservative (16%) and very conservative (4%). The majority of respondents also consider
themselves Democrats (52%). In a 2014 Pew Research survey of more than 10,000 Americans,
Millennials are considerably more liberal than other generations: About four-in-ten Millennials
are mostly (28%) or consistently (13%) liberal in their views, compared with 15% who are
mostly (12%) or consistently (3%) conservative. This translates into a greater affiliation with the
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Democratic Party. Today, about half of Millennials (50%) are Democrats or lean to the
Democratic Party, while just 34% affiliate with or lean to the GOP.

Data:
Testing the Liberal Support Hypothesis
How much do you agree with the statement: "I am a feminist."
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

"None at all"
"A little"
"A moderate amount"
"A lot"
"A great deal"
Very liberal Somewhat Moderate Somewhat
Very
liberal
conservativeconservative

The question, “How much do you agree with the statement: “I am a feminist” is used to
test H1, the liberal support hypothesis. I expect to find that the more liberal you are, the more
likely you are to agree with the statement: I am a feminist. Consistent with my expectations and
existing research (McCabe 2005), I find by running a cross tabulation that the more liberal you
are, the more likely you are to agree with the statement: I am a feminist (See Table 1 in
Appendix). For instance, 64.86% of very liberal respondents said that they agree “A great deal”
with the statement “I am a feminist” while not a single conservative respondent said that they
agree “A great deal” with that statement. About one percent of very liberal respondents said that
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they do not identify at all with being a feminist while 75.00% of very conservatives didn’t
identify with being a feminist at all. These findings are significant at (X2=(df=12)=84.22 p<.05).

When I think of feminist I think of someone like me
100%
80%

Never

60%

Almost Never

40%

Sometimes

20%

Almost Always

0%
very liberal somewhat
liberal

moderate

somewhat
very
conservative conservative

Always

“When I think of feminist, I think of people like me” is also designed to test H1. I
expect that there is a statistically significant relationship between whether a person thinks of
themselves as a feminist and whether or not they are liberal or conservative. Specifically, I
expect that the more liberal a person is the more likely they are to think of feminist and think of
people like themselves. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that the more liberal a person is
the more likely they are to think of feminist and think of people like themselves. Not a single
respondent who identified as very conservative or somewhat conservative said that when they
think of feminist they “Always” think of someone like themselves. In fact, about forty percent
of somewhat conservatives said they “Never” think of people like themselves as feminists and
the majority of respondents who identified as very conservative (75.00%) said they “never”
think of people like themselves as feminists. This is important because it suggests that there is
an understanding among conservatives that most feminists are liberal, supporting the idea that
perhaps based off of their identification alone, conservatives are reluctant to identify as
feminist. These findings are significant at (X2=(df=16)=111.61 p<.00).
21

It is worth noting that in both of these feminist identification questions, there is a
distinct difference between men and women. Thirty-eight percent of men said they “Never”
think of feminists as people like themselves in comparison to only 8.67% of women who said
they “Never” think of feminists as people like themselves. When asked, “How much do you
agree with the statement: I am a feminist” 38.20% of men answered “None at all” while only
5.78% of women answered “None at all”. These findings are consistent with Anderson (2009)
who found that men were far more reluctant than women to identify themselves as feminists.
These findings may also support the broader idea that there is a “Man-hating” perception of
feminism that prevents young people, particularly young men, from identifying as feminist.

The question, “How important is it to you that women hold elected office?” also helps
test my liberal support hypothesis. Placing importance on women in office may explain why
some people are more likely to identify as feminist and support feminist policies. Consistent with
the existing understanding that the Democratic Party is the party of women’s rights (Schreiber
2012), I expect to find that liberals regard women holding office as more important than
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conservative women. I find that 82.43% of respondents who identify as very liberal, and 51.9%
of respondents who identify as somewhat liberal, say that women holding elected office is
“Extremely important”. Only 25% of those who identify as somewhat conservatives and 8.33%
of respondents who identify as very conservative say that women holding elected office is
“Extremely important”. No respondents that identified as very liberal say that having women
hold elected office is “Not at all important” when 33.33% of respondents that are very
conservative say this was “Not at all important.” These findings are significant at
(X2=(df=16)=99.61 p<.00).
It is important to note that there is a larger relationship coming into play here. It is a
general fact that fewer Republican women than Democratic women hold elected office; however,
the causal direction is still in question. Are there fewer Republican office holders because
conservatives don’t care about women holding elected office as demonstrated here? Or it the
other way around? With just this data, causation can’t be proven. This question has serious
implications for understanding how attitudes on feminist issues may shape the demographics of
our elected office holders.
Similar to, “How important is it to you that women hold elected office?”, the question,
“How concerned are you personally about women’s rights?” helps test the liberal support
hypothesis. I expect that the more liberal you are, the more likely you are to be concerned about
women’s rights. Consistent with my expectations, the majority of respondents who identified as
very liberal (79.73%) and Somewhat liberal (56.96%) were “Very concerned” about women’s
rights, whereas the largest percentage of people who identified as somewhat conservative were
only “Moderately concerned” (34.09%) and the largest portion of very conservative respondents
were “Not concerned” (41.67%). These findings are significant at (X2=(df=16)=120.38 p<.00).
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Additionally, 57% of very liberal respondents and 40% of somewhat liberal respondents said that
gender equality was one of their top three issues they consider when they vote, whereas 13% of
conservatives and 0% of very conservative respondents said that gender equality was one of their
top issues.
Overall, these questions regarding the importance of women’s issues seem to suggest that
conservatives think that gender equality is less important than liberals, which may explain why
more conservatives are reluctant to identify as feminist. Specifically, this data on young
conservatives appears to be compatible with the theory of the “Post-Feminist Era” as described
by Aaronson (2003) and Scharff (2012).

Testing the Policy-Label Gap Hypothesis
Should private employers be required to pay men and women the same
salary for the same job?
100%
90%
80%
70%

Never

60%

Almost never

50%

Sometimes

40%
30%

Most of the time

20%

Always

10%
0%
very liberal somewhat
liberal

moderate

somewhat
very
conservative conservative
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The question, “Should private employers be required to pay men and women the same
salary for the same job?” helps test the policy-label gap hypothesis. Based on this theory, I predict
that conservative respondents will support equal pay despite not using the label of feminist. The
majority of very liberal (95.95%), somewhat liberal (87.34%), moderate (63.64%), and somewhat
conservative (61.36%) respondents said that employers should always be required to pay men and
women the same for the same job (This is consistent with my liberal support hypothesis). Only the
largest amount of very conservative respondents said private employers should be required to pay
both sexes the same salary “most of the time” (42.67%). These findings are significant at
(X2=(df=16)=58.18 p<.00). Although the majorities of conservative respondents agreed that men
and women should be paid equally, there are still big differences across groups. Notably, there is
more support for mandating equal pay among liberals.
Similar to this finding, the vast majority of self-identified Democrats (88.41%) said that
private employers should “Always” be required to pay men and women the same salary for the
same job. The majority of Republicans (57.14%) also said this should “Always” be the case
(p<.00).
These findings are somewhat surprising since conservatives often push back against the
notion of a gender pay gap. Top conservatives, along with The Republican National Committee
have called statistics regarding pay inequality “misleading” and said that the gender pay gap as
whole is a “myth” (Bassett 2014). This finding shows that young conservatives and young
Republicans might be more supportive of equal pay legislation than what their lack of feminist
identification initially suggests.
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For the purpose of further testing the policy-label gap hypothesis, H2A and H2B, I then
combined very liberal and somewhat liberal respondents to make the category of liberal. I also
combined very conservative and somewhat conservative to make the category of conservative. I
did this to more easily compare liberal and conservatives. In terms of the self-identification as a
feminist question, I combined “a great deal” and “a lot” in order to encompass all majority
support/use of the feminist label. This was also done to simplify the comparison.
I then compared liberal and conservative’s identification as feminist with support for
equal pay. The answers “Always” or “Most of the time” constitute support for equal pay.

Consistent with my expectation in H2A, support for feminist policies is greater than selfidentification as a feminist for both conservatives and liberals. Consistent with my expectation in
H2B, the difference between policy support and feminist self-identification is greater among
conservatives than liberals. This suggests that conservative millennials are sympathetic to the
position of equal pay yet strongly reject the feminist label. This highlights that there is a strong
negative stigma about feminism prohibiting young conservatives from identifying as feminists
despite holding some positive views towards gender equality. (See Table 5 in Appendix).
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Mean Support for FAMILY Act
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Very liberal

Somewhat liberal

Moderate

Somewhat
conservative

Very conservative

The question “How much do you support the following bill” asks about support for the
FAMILY Act and tests support for actual policy involving government involvement in the gender
pay gap issue. Specifically, I ask about support for the FAMILY Act in order to test the policylabel gap hypothesis to see if despite not holding the title of feminist, respondents support this
legislation. The FAMILY Act establishes a national insurance fund paid for through employee and
employer contributions and provides eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of paid leave with
66 percent wage replacement (A full description of the FAMILY Act can be found in the
Appendix.)
Support was measured using a seven-point scale. 0 was the lowest score possible (lowest
amount of support for the legislation) and 7 was the highest score possible (highest amount of
support for the legislation). Specifically, a score of 0 meant there was no support, a score of 1 or
2 meant there was little support, a score of 3 or 4 meant there was moderate support, a score of 5
or 6 meant there was a lot of support and a score of 7 meant there was complete support.
Consistent with the liberal support hypothesis, the most support for the bill came from
respondents who identified as “Very liberal” and “Liberal” with 58.10% of Very liberal
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respondents giving their total support (score of 7) for the bill and 29.11% of Liberal respondents
giving their total support (score of 7) for the bill. Moderates, Somewhat conservatives and Very
conservatives had mixed support of the bill. The largest percentage of moderates (25.45%),
conservatives (29.54%) and strong conservatives (36.36%) all had some support for the bill (score
of 4).
Although there is far more support among liberals than conservatives, the fact that
conservatives had some support for the bill may be considered surprising since, historically,
Republicans have opposed paid family leave laws. The only federal parental-leave law currently
in place is The Family and Medical Leave Act (1993), which ensures 12 weeks of unpaid time off,
only for full-time workers at companies with at least 50 employees. Although this bill ultimately
passed, 134 House Republicans voted against it, including former Speaker of the House John
Boehner (Mertens 2015).

To further test the policy-label gap hypothesis, I compared self-identification as a feminist
with support for paid family leave. In this case, I combined responses that were a 5, 6 and 7 and
recorded them as “support for paid family leave” because all of these numbers indicate strong
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support for the FAMILY Act. (Similar to how variables were combined in the equal pay question,
this was done to simplify the comparison between liberal and conservative’s self-identification
and policy support.) Consistent with my expectation in H2A, support for feminist policies is greater
than self-identification as a feminist for both conservatives and liberals. Consistent with my
expectation in H2B, the difference between policy support and feminist self-identification is greater
among conservatives than liberals. The differences are not as big as they were with attitudes
towards equal pay. It is important to note that among conservatives, there is less support for the
FAMILY Act than there is for the general idea of paying men and women the same salary for the
same work. This implies that conservatives and liberals may have different solutions to the same
goal, pay equality. Although complicated, overall this finding suggests that conservative
millennials are somewhat sympathetic to paid family leave yet strongly reject the label. (See Table
5 in Appendix).
Which of the following statements best matches your view on abortion?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Always Pro-Life
Rape, Incest, Danger to Mother or
Child
Govt. shouldn't ban it
Not after the first 3 months
Always Pro-Choice
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Asking about abortion is important when studying the meaning of feminism because for
so many, like in the feminist march on Washington, the right to choose is a non-negotiable part
of the feminist platform. This issue has been one the biggest sources of contention among
conservatives and liberals; however, new data (Jacobson 2015) shows that conservatives are
increasingly socially liberal. This lead me to expect that young conservatives will be relatively
pro-choice. However, this is not the case. The vast majority of very liberal (91.89%) and
somewhat liberal (77.22%) respondents said that it should always be the woman’s choice.
Somewhat conservatives were very split, 25% said it should always be the women’s choice,
22.73% said not after the first three months, 25% said they don’t agree with abortion but
government shouldn’t ban it, 20.45% said it should only be legal in certain instances and only
6.82% said abortion should never be legal. Very conservative respondents were also split but the
greatest percentage of them thought that abortion should only be legal in the cases of rape, incest
or danger to the mother or child (41.67%). These findings are significant at (X2=(df=16)=115.28
p<.00).
Very similar results appear when Democrats and Republicans answered this question.
Eighty-two percent of Democrats said that it should always be the woman’s choice compared to
only 23.21% of Republicans. Republicans were very split, but the largest percentage of
Republicans (25.00%) said that abortion should only be legal in the cases of rape, incest or danger
or the mother or child.
These findings are relatively consistent with national studies on abortion among the general
population. The most recent Pew Research poll (2016) showed that 38% of Republicans said that
abortion should be legal in all/most cases compared to 70% of Democrats that said abortion should
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be legal in all/most cases. There is a very clear divide between these two political groups on the
issue of abortion and not much room for common ground.

To further test the policy-label gap hypothesis, I compared self-identification as a feminist
with support for abortion. The different answers for the abortion question captured very distinct
attitudes on abortion such as whether or not it should be legal in specific cases, (ie. Rape). I chose
to only include the response “It should always be the women’s choice” to indicate someone who
supports abortion. As shown in the women’s march on Washington, pro-choice is the only
acceptable feminist position on abortion (“Pro-Life Feminist” 2017). Consistent with my
expectation in H2A, support for abortion is greater than self-identification as a feminist for both
conservatives and liberals. Inconsistent with my expectation in H2B, the difference between policy
support and feminist self-identification is not greater among conservatives than liberals. The
difference is about the same.
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Conclusion:
It is important to remember several limitations of this study. There were only 312
respondents and they were not representative of the country in terms of geography, socio-economic
status, sex and ethnicity. More research is needed on a wider scale that uses a representative
population. Also, more research is needed that compares younger conservatives and Republicans
to older conservatives and Republicans. While Jacobson (2016) helps lay the foundation for
understanding that young conservatives are more moderate than their older counterparts, more
research is needed to explore how this applies to feminist values. It is important to have
information on a possible trend of more conservatives supporting feminist policies and it is
important to have data from older age groups to draw better comparisons.
Despite these limitations, there are still important takeaways from this research. One of my
major findings is that there is a statistically significant relationship between political ideology and
likeliness to identify as a feminist. Consistent with my liberal support hypothesis, the more liberal
you are, the more likely you are to agree with the statement: I am a feminist. In addition, the more
liberal you are, the more likely you are to agree that when you think of the term feminist, you think
of someone like yourself.
There are differences when looking at what liberals and conservatives view as important.
It is “Extremely important” to self-identified liberals that women hold elected office while
conservatives are far less likely to be concerned about women’s rights and list gender equality as
one of their top issues they consider when they vote. These findings suggest that conservatives are
more likely to subscribe to the idea that they live in a “post-feminist era” where young men and
women no longer need to make strides to achieve equality, or alternatively that equality wasn’t the
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end goal (Aaronson 2003; Scharff 2012). Conservatives perceiving the need for gender equality
differently may very well contribute to their lack of identifying as feminist.
There are both similarities and differences between conservatives and liberals on policy
issues. The majority of conservative, very liberal and somewhat liberal respondents agreed that
private employers should be required to pay men and women the same salary for equal work.
Additionally, the majority of both Democrats and Republicans said that women should always be
paid the same as men for the same job. When looking at paid family leave, the FAMILY Act had
mild support from conservatives and strong support among liberals. These findings were consistent
with my hypothesis that conservatives would be sympathetic to feminist policies despite not
identifying as feminist. In both of these cases, support for feminist policy was greater than feminist
self-identification and the gap between these was greater among conservatives than liberals. Yet,
inconsistent with my hypothesis, conservatives and Republicans were far more likely to oppose
abortion than liberals and Democrats and the gap between self-identification as a feminist and
support for abortion was not greater among conservatives.
The overall question of why young people are reluctant to identify as feminists is worth
exploring. Not identifying as feminist seems as though it can have negative implications for policy
preferences and outcomes that strengthen gender equality. If more women identified as feminists,
it seems probable that more policy favoring women’s rights could be passed. This can be explained
by the “feminist accountability” mechanism described by Mansbridge (1995) which is when
women who identify as feminist internalize accountability to the women’s movement and in turn,
help create or support policy that favors women’s rights. This idea is supported by the fact that
there is a clear relationship between feminist identity and work on women’s rights bills within the
state legislature (Carroll 2003). The women legislators who identify as feminist and are involved
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with feminist women's organizations like the National Organization for Women (NOW) are more
likely than other women to work on legislation aimed at helping women (Carroll 2003). More
research involving national politics rather than state politics is needed to understand the effect of
feminist identification on policy.
If the feminist label impacts the actions of elected officials, it seems probable that
identifying as a feminist has positive consequences for the general public. If more women
identified as feminists it seems likely more women would hold themselves accountable to
participate in demonstrations and activities that help strengthen women’s equality. It also seems
possible that these women would hold their legislators accountable for passing legislation that
increases gender equality. More research is needed to examine whether or not identifying as a
feminist is positively correlated with more women’s rights activism and support for policy that
favors gender equality.
I use this information to conclude that rather than focusing on the policy differences there
are between conservatives and liberals on abortion, scholars and feminists should recognize that
there is common ground on issues like equal pay that can help bring more people into the feminist
movement. For the issues of equal pay, paid family leave and abortion, support for the policy was
greater than self-identification as a feminist among both liberals and conservatives. The gap
between self-identification and policy support was also greatest among conservatives for the issues
of equal pay and paid family leave. This shows that respondents, particularly conservatives, are
sympathetic to feminist policies despite not labeling themselves as feminist.
This research has led me to believe that for every young conservative that has negative
feelings towards feminism or is sidelined at a women’s march, there is someone that, maybe
unknowingly, supports some feminist objectives. Whether they are turned away by the label or
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completely rejected by the movement, I believe that being conservative and being feminist aren’t
mutually exclusive. Understanding the complex relationship between feminist self-identification
and the common ground conservatives share with liberals on feminist policies is important.
Hopefully one day, conservatives and liberals will be able to walk side by side at a Women’s
March on Washington, with some similar objectives, some different values, but just one label:
Feminist.
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Appendices
Q Rank these issues in order of importance to you, 1 being the most important, 8 being the least:
______ Global Terrorism (1)
______ Economy (2)
______ Gun reform (3)
______ Immigration reform (4)
______ Social justice (5)
______ Gender equality (6)
______ Climate Change (7)
______ Education (8)
Q Which the following statements best matches your view on the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)?
m I support Obama Care but I think a single payer system would be better (1)
m I support Obama Care (2)
m I don't support Obama Care. Open markets allow for competition that brings down costs (3)
Q Which of the following statements best matches your view on gun control?
m All guns should be banned from public use (1)
m We need stricter background checks and restrictions on assault weapons (2)
m Further restrictions would infringe on 2nd Amendment rights (3)
Q Should employers be required to pay men and women the same salary for the same job?
m Always (1)
m Most of the time (2)
m Sometimes (3)
m Almost never (4)
m Never (5)
Q Which of the following statements best matches your view on abortion?
m It should always be the woman's choice (1)
m I support the woman's right to choose but not after the first three months (2)
m I don't agree with abortion but the government shouldn't have a right to ban it (3)
m Abortion should only be legal in the cases of rape, incest or danger to the mother or child (4)
m Abortion should never be legal (5)
Q On a scale of 0 to 7, 0 being not at all, 7 being fully, how much do you support same sex marriage?
______ Same sex marriage (1)
Q Should people who entered the United States illegally be given a chance to become legal citizens?
m Always (1)
m Most of the time (2)
m About half the time (3)
m Sometimes (4)
m Never (5)
Q On a scale of 0 to 7, 0 being not at all, 7 being fully, How much do you support the following bill? Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act or
the FAMILY Act, which:
• Establishes a national insurance fund paid for through employee and employer contributions of two-tenths of one percent of a worker’s wagesabout $2.00 per week for a typical worker.
• Provides eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of paid leave with 66 percent wage replacement for a personal or family member’s medical
emergency, including those arising from service members’ deployment, or to care for a newborn or adopted baby.
• Is gender and age neutral, and covers workers--young and elderly, single and married, men and women, working part time or full time in all
companies, no matter their size.
______ FAMILY Act (1)
Q On a scale of 0 to 7, 0 being not a problem to 7 being a big problem, how problematic do you think sexual assault is in the military?
______ Sexual Assault in the Millitary (1)
Q On a scale of 0 to 7, 0 being don't support to 7 being fully support, how much do you support Planned Parenthood?
______ Planned Parenthood (1)
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Q How important is it to you that women represent you in politics?
m Extremely important (1)
m Very important (2)
m Moderately important (3)
m Slightly important (4)
m Not at all important (5)
Q How concerned are you personally about women's rights?
m Very concerned (1)
m Somewhat concerned (2)
m Moderately concerned (3)
m Slightly concerned (4)
m Not concerned (5)
Q How much do you agree with the statement: I am a feminist
m A great deal (1)
m A lot (2)
m A moderate amount (3)
m A little (4)
m None at all (5)
Q How much do you agree with the statement: I am an antifeminist
m A great deal (1)
m A lot (2)
m A moderate amount (3)
m A little (4)
m None at all (5)
Q Do you identify as:
m Male (1)
m Female (2)
m Other (3)
Q What is your highest level of education
m Highschool Degree (1)
m Associates Degree (2)
m Bachelors Degree (3)
m Masters Degree (4)
m Doctorate Degree (5)
Q Please select your age:
m 18-22 (1)
m 23-26 (2)
Q Please select your race
m White (1)
m African American (2)
m Hispanic (3)
m Native American (4)
m Asian (5)
Q Where do you place yourself on an ideological scale from liberal to conservative?
o
Very Liberal
o
Somewhat Liberal
o
Moderate
o
Somewhat Conservative
o
Very Conservative
Q Do you identify as:
m Democrat (1)
m Independent (2)
m Republican (3)
m Other (4)
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Table 1: How much do you agree with the statement: "I am a feminist"?

A great deal

A lot

A moderate

A little

None at all

Total

74

amount
Very liberal

48

14

9

2

1

64.86%

18.92%

12.16%

2.70%

1.35%

21

23

27

3

5

26.58%

29.11%

34.18%

3.80%

6.33%

8

10

16

9

12

14.55%

18.18%

29.09%

16.36%

21.82%

Somewhat

0

5

10

12

17

conservative

0.00%

11.36%

22.73%

27.27%

38.64%

Very conservative

0

0

0

3

9

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

25.00%

75.00%

77

52

62

29

44

Somewhat liberal

Ideology

Moderate

Total

79

55

44

12

264

Table 2: When I think of feminist I think of someone like me

Always

Almost Always

Sometimes

Almost Never

Never

Total

18

23

28

3

2

74

24.32%

31.08%

37.84%

4.05%

2.70%

Somewhat

4

24

36

9

6

Liberal

5.06%

30.38%

45.57%

11.39%

7.59%

Moderate

1

10

18

12

14

1.82%

18.18%

32.73%

21.82%

25.45%

Somewhat

0

1

14

11

18

conservative

0.00%

2.27%

31.82%

25.00%

40.91%

Very

0

0

1

2

9

conservative

0.00%

0.00%

8.33%

16.67%

75.00%

Total

23

58

97

37

49

Very Liberal

Ideology

40

79

55

44

12

264

Table 3: How important is it to you that women hold elected office in the U.S.?
Extremely

Very

Moderately

Slightly

Not at all

important

important

important

important

important

61

13

0

0

0

82.43%

17.57%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Somewhat

41

20

15

1

2

liberal

51.90%

25.32%

18.99%

1.27%

2.53%

Moderate

20

20

9

4

2

36.36%

36.36%

16.36%

7.27%

3.64%

Somewhat

11

9

9

8

7

conservative

25.00%

20.45%

20.45%

18.18%

15.91%

Very

1

2

4

1

4

conservative

8.33%

16.67%

33.33%

8.33%

33.33%

Total

134

64

37

14

15

Very liberal

Ideology

Total

74

79

55

44

12

264

Table 4: Should private employers be required to pay men and women the same salary for the same job?
Always

Most of the time

Sometimes

Almost never

Never

Total

71

3

0

0

0

74

95.95%

4.05%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Somewhat

69

9

1

0

0

liberal

87.34%

11.39%

1.27%

0.00%

0.00%

Moderate

35

16

1

1

2

63.64%

29.09%

1.82%

1.82%

3.64%

Somewhat

27

13

2

1

1

conservative

61.36%

29.55%

4.55%

2.27%

2.27%

Very

4

5

1

0

2

conservative

33.33%

41.67%

8.33%

0.00%

16.67%

Very liberal

Ideology

41

79

55

44

12

Table 5:
Self-Identification vs. Support for Policy

Self-identification:
Support for equal pay:
Support for paid family
leave:
Support for pro-choice:
Total

Liberal
106

Conservative
5

152

49

131

18

129
153

13
56

Table 6:
Support for the FAMILY Act

Ideology

Table 7

42

Table 7: Which of the following best matches your opinion on Abortion?

Always the

Not after the first 3

Gov. shouldn’t

Rape, incest or

woman’s choice

months

ban it

danger to

Pro-life

Total

74

mother/ child
Very liberal

Somewhat
Ideology

liberal
Moderate

Somewhat
conservative
Very
conservative

68

6

0

0

0

91.89%

8.11%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

61

14

4

0

0

77.22%

17.72%

5.06%

0.00%

0.00%

27

10

11

6

1

49.09%

18.18%

20.00%

10.91%

1.82%

11

10

11

9

3

25.00%

22.73%

25.00%

20.45%

6.82%

2

2

1

5

2

16.67%

16.67%

8.33%

41.67%

16.67%

43

79

55

44

12

